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Abstract: A robust institutional framework is essential to enable fi rms to function ef-
fi ciently. Th e aspect of corporate governance investigated in this paper is the legal and 
societal principles and process which form the business context within which fi rms 
operate. Th e paper explores the challenges to fi rms trading in Africa arising from cul-
tural dynamics peculiar to the continent and further explores the historical reasons 
for the present cultural context to business in Africa. Nigeria is presented as a spe-
cial case, perhaps even an extreme case, of the challenges to corporate governance in 
Africa since it is perceived by many to be one of the weaker environments given its 
perceived levels of corruption. Th e paper concludes with an assessment of the likeli-
hood of African states successfully tackling corruption in the future as the current ap-
proaches unfold over the coming years. 
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Introduction
While there are numerous defi nitions of corporate governance for the pur-
poses of this paper corporate governance refers to the legal, quasi legal and 
societal principles and process established in relation to incorporated bodies 
(Letza  & Sun, 2004; Letza, Smallman, & Sun, 2004; Letza, Sun, & Kirkbride, 
2004). Governance arrangements are multi-fold but in essence are the arrange-
ments established to ensure that corporate entities meet acceptable standards 
of ethical and professional conduct in their activities. Th e whole issue of cor-
porate governance has come under intense global focus recently following the 
credit crunch around the world. Failures in corporate governance have been 
cited as a major contributor to the fi nancial crisis of 2008 (Kirkpatrick, 2009; 
Dermine, 2013) While there are multiple underlying causes of the credit crunch 
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it is thought that a major contributing factor is the failure of unregulated swaps 
markets (Murphy, 2008) a possible indication that sophistication of the indus-
try had outpaced the governance arrangements. According to (Arner, 2009) 
apart from the fact that fi nancial institutions did not manage their own risks 
or businesses, one of the major causes was the divergence between domes-
tic regulatory structures and the realities of global fi nance. Th is raises many 
questions on the gap between robust corporate governance and the prevailing 
business context. For example, do governance arrangements need to keep pace 
with the business context and compliance dynamics for risks to remain con-
tained in today’s interconnected and diverse world? For foreign fi rms, what is 
the level of divergence between domestic regulatory structures and the reali-
ties of doing business in a diff erent cultural context? Foreign fi rms wishing to 
keep their risks to manageable levels need to know therefore what governance 
arrangements are in place, whether or not they are in consonance with the 
business context and whether or not they are prepared for the local challenges 
to corporate governance. Specifi c to this paper, how diff erent is the business 
culture in Africa from that of the Western world and how much of an impact 
does this have on corporate governance? 
Th e aims of this paper are to provide an understanding of the Business 
Context in Africa and the compliance arrangements for Africa and to assess 
the fi t or otherwise between compliance arrangements and the business con-
text in Africa.
Th e fundamental assumption in this paper is that Nigeria represents a spe-
cial case, perhaps even an extreme case, of the challenges to corporate govern-
ance in Africa since it is perceived by many to be one of the weaker environ-
ments given its perceived levels of corruption (Transparency International, 
2008; Apampa, 2005; Smith, 2005; Meredith, 2005), and so illustrations from 
Nigeria would be useful. Th e second assumption is that cultural diff erences 
between the West and Africa largely account for why tried and tested solu-
tions/arrangements from the West rarely translate adequately into similar ef-
fectiveness in Africa. Finally, it is assumed that corporate governance refers to 
the governance arrangements in place to ensure that formal rules, principles 
and processes are complied with which were established to ensure that corpo-
rate entities meet acceptable standards of ethical and professional conduct in 
their activities.
Section 1 provides a backcloth to the African context through discussion of 
the Ubuntu philosophy as a traditional value system and potential alternative 
to the Western systems. Section 2 presents a review of the historical context to 
present day Africa. Section 3 discusses a possible response to the established 
corrupt business environment in Africa. Section 4 outlines the modern approach 
to corporate governance in Africa. Th e paper concludes with an assessment of 
the likelihood of African states successfully tackling corruption in the future 
as the current approaches unfold over the coming years.
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1. Th e Backcloth of the Ubuntu philosophy
Th e term Ubuntu is uniquely African and its origin developed within the tra-
ditional African family system and the related ‘clan’ system as an extension to 
family. Th e term refers specifi cally to sub-Saharan Africa and it defi nes how 
people and communities should behave in their interactions (Taylor, 2014). 
According to Turyahikayo (2014), Ubuntu is based on the realisation that the 
humanness that I share with others makes me conscious of the reality that in 
my essential being I depend on the essential beingness of the other. Th erefore, 
“being for the other” appears to be a necessary condition for being for myself ’ 
(p. 66). Africans are socialised within a  society that promotes collectivism, 
unity and pluralism. It is a way of life that Africans believe in and practice in 
their daily interactions with others. ‘A person is a person through other per-
sons’ and can best be known as humanness or being human although its sig-
nifi cance is far greater than that (Taylor, 2014). Boodryk (2002) has defi ned 
it as humanness, Ramose (1999) and Mkhize (2008) both argue that Ubuntu 
could be best understood in terms of its etymology. All, however, emphasize its 
nature as a communitarian ethic. In the context of this paper the understand-
ing will be that Ubuntu is a means of establishing or determining relationships 
between people based on the saying that ‘a person is a person through other 
people’ and will be understood to mean humanness. 
2. Recent historical analysis of the context
African countries have consistently scored less than 5 on the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) (10 being least corrupt and 0 most corrupt) since 
Transparency International began publishing it in 1995. Th erefore, corruption 
is generally perceived to be pervasive, systemic and endemic in many parts of 
Africa. With the possible exception of Botswana, Mauritius, Cape Verde and 
South Africa, It would appear that the perceptions of corruption in the re-
gion have not changed suffi  ciently to bring it at least to the point where the 
region is no longer amongst those perceived to be ‘most corrupt’ even if it has 
not quite joined the group of those perceived to be ‘least corrupt’. Botswana, 
Mauritius, Cape Verde and South Africa are also amongst the top performers 
(those scoring 70% and over) on the Ibrahim Index on African Governance 
that “assesses national progress in fi ve key areas which together constitute 
a  holistic defi nition of good governance: Safety and Security; Rule of Law, 
Transparency and Corruption; Participation and Human Rights; Sustainable 
Economic Development; and Human Development”. From the above it would 
appear that corruption and corrupt behaviours are inimical to good govern-
ance and by extension good corporate governance in Africa. Th is section traces 
the origins of corruption in order to provide a background against which to 
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project current governance arrangements for corporate governance and also 
a framework within which to assess the adequacy or otherwise of such arrange-
ments and aid the identifi cation of challenges to good practice in Africa today.
Th e assumption that cultural diff erences between the West and Africa largely 
account for why tried and tested solutions/arrangements from the West rarely 
translate adequately into similar eff ectiveness in Africa would lead us to in-
vestigate what specifi c cultural attribute is common to the countries of Africa 
and then test for whether or not that attribute is found in the West. Th e popu-
lation distribution varies signifi cantly with Nigeria alone accounting for 20% 
of the continent’s population. Not all countries have a signifi cant coast line 
and at least 19 are landlocked. Th e physical appearance and characteristics of 
Africans is markedly diff erent from North to South, East to West. Although 
there are groups of countries with language commonalities, and therefore cul-
ture too, they are usually restricted to a narrow geography such as Kiswahili 
speakers in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania. Likewise along the Sahel Savannah belt 
of Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso 
you will fi nd Hausa mixed with Arabic being spoken (and a form of Creole or 
Pidgin English/French spoken in the rainforest belt of these countries but these 
pockets of culture do not cut across a suffi  cient swath of Africa to account for 
the seeming “cultural” response to corruption. It might be interesting to note 
that Nigeria alone contains over 250 ethno-linguistic groups (Meredith, 2005). 
One might even identify religious blocks such as the predominantly Muslim 
Maghreb countries to the north of Africa however; religious pluralism can 
be found in most of Africa. Th e one culture-inducing event that is common 
to the history of all of Africa barring two countries (Ethiopia and Liberia) is 
Colonialism. Although Africans have long ceased to blame all their ill fortune 
on colonialism and instead positive, forward looking, “home-grown” solutions 
to Africa’s problems by Africans like NEPAD3 have emerged, let us, just for the 
sake of this analysis, revisit the issue of colonialism in Africa.
Th e colonisation of sub-Saharan Africa by Britain, France, Portugal, Belgium, 
Germany, Spain and Italy took place during the latter part of the 19th centu-
ry (Simmons, 2009). Th e ‘carving up’ of Africa into European style territori-
ally defi ned states has led to many of Africa’s contemporary economic prob-
lems and confl icts (Simmons, 2009; Meredith, 2005). Borders were drawn up 
with little regard for both indigenous societies and the physical ecology of the 
land. Many ethnic groups found themselves divided by these colonial bound-
aries (Simmons). Th is impacted negatively on existing social and trading ar-
rangements. Th e move towards independence and decolonisation began aft er 
the end of the Second World War (WWII) (Simmons, 2009; Meredith, 2005; 
Isichei, 1983). Colonisation had also given many Africans the opportunity to 
study abroad. Th is had the eff ect of exposing them to the democratic process-
 3 New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development.
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es which existed in the colonising countries causing them to question the au-
thoritarian rule being forced on them back in their home countries (Simmons, 
2009; Isichei, 1983). It is believed that out of Colonialism grew a new privi-
leged class in Africa established only through their Western education such 
as teachers, civil servants, leaders of parastatal and government trade unions 
(Ake, 1987; Isichei, 1983) as opposed to the traditional leaders of the people. It 
was this group who moved for independence of their states and the key strat-
egy they employed was to encourage non-cooperation of the people with the 
Colonialists in order to sabotage their rule (Ekeh, 1975). Th e ordinary people 
were encouraged to show up for work late, evade taxes, be insubordinate and 
resist their white employers, embark on strike action where possible (Ekeh, 
1975), misuse government property, leak offi  cial secrets and engage in un-
sanctioned activities (Oladoyin, Elumilade, & Ashaolu, 2005). We learn from 
(Isichei, 1983) that this would not have been hard to achieve given the depth 
of ill feeling ordinary people had towards the Colonialists especially because 
of the imposition of taxes and the perceived inequities in society. Indeed, the 
story is told of the Nigerian trade union leader, Michael Imoudu, “who became 
a hero in colonial Nigeria for encouraging strikes against the British, a prac-
tice that earned him strong resentment from his former collaborators, now in 
government, when he repeated it against his own independent nation, with the 
British gone” (Ekeh, 1975). 
At independence the mask was removed. Th e African masses confronted an 
indigenous ruling class, which was content to inherit the colonial economy and 
disinclined to transform it. Th e only apparent way to mobilize the economic 
resources which would allow the local political class to initiate any kind of de-
velopment strategy and begin to challenge foreign capital for the control of the 
economy was through statism. Simmons, 2009 suggests that for the process of 
colonisation to work as effi  ciently as it did for so long a very centralised and “to-
talitarian” state (Isichei, 1983) needed to be created by the colonising Europeans. 
When African countries gained independence this is what they inherited. Single 
party systems with authoritarian centralised governments were essentially what 
Africans had been living with for the previous seventy to eighty years. It would 
have seemed logical for this form of government to continue. “Th ey could not 
consolidate their power without creating a material base for it for which they 
used their political leverage to appropriate wealth with state power” (Ake, 1987).
Th e new privileged class, having displaced the Colonialists, related to the 
people in a manner reminiscent of but oft en worse than the Colonialists had 
done and so the strategy of non-cooperation and sabotage continued until 
it became habit and part of the socially constructed reality of many citizens. 
In  Nigeria today such behaviours are seen as part of the “culture” (Aluko, 
2002)) or at least what informs how one generally relates to civic responsibilities 
(Akindele, 2005). Igbo Culture in South Eastern Nigeria has it that Government 
work is “Oluoyibo” meaning “the white man’s work” and the Yoruba’s in South 
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Western Nigeria have a saying “a ki s’ise ijoba la oogun” meaning “one does 
not break sweat doing government work” which further demonstrate the dis-
connect between modern civic values and traditional values. Th e transition of 
many African societies from traditional to modern has presented some pecu-
liar problems, one of which is corruption (Okafor, 2009). Governments have 
seized power and wielded authority in Africa since independence but only 
a scarce few have established legitimacy with the ordinary citizens since po-
litical corruption which is rife ultimately deprives a political system of legiti-
macy (Oladoyin et al., 2005).
Ordinary folk watching these events in the civic space must begin to un-
derstand the goals that African society seems to be setting for them. Th e high-
est social stratum of African society has been used as a tool of class formation 
and is seen by those from lower strata as a means of survival and social mo-
bility (Okafor, 2009). Diff erent European countries used various styles of co-
lonial administration. Th e French used assimilation (or direct rule). Africans 
essentially became citizens of France. Th e British favoured a system of indirect 
rule where local elites were chosen to manage the administration of the colo-
ny (Isichei, 1983). Th is meant that the French eff ectively dismantled many of 
the existing social structures while the British allowed these structures to con-
tinue. However, the British model required a system of ‘divide and rule’ where 
any opposing traditional structures were purposely maintained in order to stop 
any chance of a common ideology of anti-colonial nationalism occurring such 
as that experienced in India. Th e outcomes in post-colonial African states are 
quite diff erent in response to these diff ering colonial systems. Former French 
colonies tend to lead to a ranked system of ethnic stratifi cation. Subordinate 
groups have little or no ability to improve their situation through political pro-
cesses. In former British colonies, however all ethnic groups (even minorities) 
appear to be able to organise themselves politically” (Simmons). According to 
Meredith, 2005 amongst the messages that have come through loud and clear 
is that society expects you to get rich quick; and that wealth without hard work 
is a virtue. During colonial times the primary means cherished by society was 
education but the goals were the same. As soon as you got out of an institu-
tion of higher learning, you would simply demand your right of access to this 
better life and it was granted. Th e neo-colonial economy has nurtured a value-
system which glorifi es wealth and encourages its accumulation at all costs and 
by all means but especially through political and/or public offi  ce connections 
(Okafor, 2009); however, society at every point has failed to grant equal access 
to the means it has touted. Th e experiences of people in trying to live up to so-
cietal goals (noting those who succeed and what means they used, those who 
failed and what means they used) has created a system of myths, shared beliefs 
and norms that have successively shaped the collective value system. Where 
the goals themselves are suspect like the cherished “get rich quick” or “wealth 
without hard work”, the value system deriving from their pursuit has been sus-
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pect too. Corruption occurs as a result of dissonance between our social real-
ity and our expectations4 and where society does not adequately regulate the 
natural drives of individuals who are in pursuit of such expectations, corrup-
tion begins to spread unchecked. It is of course more rampant now because 
education is relatively commonplace compared to what it was like in colonial 
days and so that particular means is being replaced by access to political and 
public offi  ce – the new way that society prices for scarcity of access to resourc-
es (in the old days the “haves and have nots” were distinguished through the 
labels “educated” and “not educated”. Today the dividing line is increasingly 
between “connected” and “not connected”). Access to political and public of-
fi ce is limited and in a sub-regional economy with a poor performing real sec-
tor the competition between the privileged classes is all the more heightened 
and with it the need for those in control shore up their position and to buy off  
strong competitors. 
Where have these ideas come from? Th ere are fi ve responses open to ordi-
nary citizens who are confronted by these goals and means set by society. First, 
conform by accepting both the goals and prescribed means; second, accept the 
goals but not necessarily the means by striving to obtain success by “innovat-
ing” and taking advantage of a range of “deviant” means available in place of the 
less accessible “conventional” means in order to attain success; third, abandon 
the goals but keep the means, concentrate on retaining what little you possibly 
gained or still have in place of going aft er a higher yield of success; fourth, re-
treat into escapism, abandon both the goals and the means – like drug addicts, 
alcoholics, vagrants, and the severely mentally ill whose reactions repress them 
from society making them unable to obtain success via the prescribed means 
and fi nally, rebel against both/either goals and/or means and create your own 
goals and/or means. Replace such ideas with irrational objectives which may 
include the violent overthrow of the system altogether. 
In  Nigeria one can observe an eclectic range of responses in operation. 
A good number have chosen to be “innovative” in the pursuit of fl awed societal 
goals (for example, Nigeria is now notorious for advance fee fraud or scams, 
drug traffi  cking and money laundering) (Meredith, 2005) in some other coun-
tries it is human traffi  cking and sham marriages to foreigners and this sets up 
a vicious cycle further entrenching corruption. Others simply conform to the 
status quo (Aluko, 2002). Th ose who do not want to be corrupt are left  with the 
option of rejecting societal goals but keeping the means and trying to salvage 
what poor outcomes they can from it given the circumstances. Otherwise they 
can reject both the goals and means or follow the route of outright rebellion. 
Any of those paths would bring the individual into serious confrontation with 
society. In the Niger Delta region, and not necessarily as an anti-corruption 
move, the youth have chosen the response of confronting society through re-
 4 A natural fall out of Merton’s Strains Th eory.
EBR 2017-01 – 4 kor.indd   190 2017-04-20   13:47:21
191S. Letza,  Corporate governance and the African business context
bellion. Fighting corruption would be in Nigeria the same as adopting strate-
gies to shake off  the social tyranny of the ruling classes who have placed their 
interests so far above those of ordinary citizens. Th eir actions have seen to the 
entrenchment of unwholesome attitudes and behaviours into new customs now 
endemic in this region. According to the great African Playwright and Nobel 
Laureate, Professor Wole Soyinka, “Th e man dies in all who keep silent in the 
face of tyranny […] in any people that submit willingly to the ‘daily humiliation 
of fear’, the man dies” (Soyinka, 1972) but according to the moral philosopher, 
Mill, “the tyranny of custom” is a repressive eff ect of society that crushes in-
dividuality (O’Toole, 1993). Society imposes costs on people for violating so-
cial norms, which in turn aff ect behaviour (Jensen & Meckling, 1994). In the 
face of such powerful interests, eff ective redress can only be sought sustainably 
through collective action. According to the (World Bank Institute, 2008) col-
lective action is known to be useful in cases where there is a need to level the 
playing fi eld between competing interests and/or where local laws and anti-
corruption practices are weak. It is a collaborative and sustained process of co-
operation among stakeholders. It increases the credibility of individual action, 
brings vulnerable individual players into a coalition of interests (an alliance of 
like minded organizations and/or individuals). Collective action is needed in 
Africa if corruption is to be brought down from its present unacceptably high 
levels. From this paper it would seem that a key objective of collective action 
must be to close the gap between civic values and traditional values. It will re-
quire focused and sustained collaboration between the civil society, govern-
ment and business watched by the entire society (Apampa, 2008). It will need 
to be socially reconstructed into a new set of customs regarding how govern-
ance is itself conducted in Africa. 
For the purposes of this paper four sources of power are discussed includ-
ing: control of resources; control of state policy; control of ideology and con-
trol of the use of force. Within this construct the rationale for successive mili-
tary coups in Nigeria and the intricate relationships between the educated elite 
(who are also the business leaders) with government can be better understood. 
Th e Northern Elites known as the “Kaduna Mafi a” for example, in the run up 
to the 1979 elections, benefi ted from corrupt government procurement in or-
der to fund activities to “protect their interests” and the elites from other parts 
of the country have also done likewise at every opportunity. 
Th e polarization of society along tribal lines by the privileged class therefore 
means that each group is trying to outdo the other one in power and authority. 
Given the intense and oft en very bitter competition between ethnically defi ned 
groups for control of public resources and control of state policy (Okafor, 2007), 
taking from the common treasury to “protect the interests” of one’s group has 
come to be seen as a legitimate self-preservation move rated by ordinary folk 
as neither moral nor immoral but as a necessary instrumental act, not arising 
from individual dispositions (Aluko, 2002). Th e societal assumption, possibly 
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arising out of Nigeria’s civil war, being that no one, except one of your own, will 
work for the advancement of your community. Th e hope of good governance 
coming from the civic space is therefore weak and what good you do get out of 
governance will more than likely come from the community level at which you 
have ownership and fi nd belonging. Increasingly today though, the Kingmakers 
are banding together into one “Class Mafi a” under the banner of the ruling party 
replacing the old “Kaduna Mafi a” (and other ethnicity based Mafi as).
If we return to the earlier construct regarding sources of power and note 
that control of resources and control of state policy are fi rmly in the grip of the 
privileged classes, then what about control of ideology and control of the use of 
force? One would rather banish the thought that violent revolution is a pana-
cea for corruption. Th ere is no evidence in history that supports the idea that 
a violent revolution can put an end to corruption in a society, it may change 
its trajectory, location or perhaps its intensity for a season but never achieve 
a sustainable response. What one can do is infl uence those used by the privi-
leged to enforce their corrupt customs (Okafor, 2007), to refuse to be so easily 
exploited for ends that damage their own long term interests. Th e other op-
tion available is the control of ideology. Diff erent groups in Nigerian society 
have their theories regarding the instrumentality of corruption in their lives. 
Ordinary citizens complain that they lack a voice; they are unable to participate 
in the processes that determine and shape their future, they do not see equity, 
justice or fairness in society and worse are the poor levels of service delivery 
from government which means that in addition to the struggle for food, shel-
ter and clothing, they have to become their own local government, each fi nd-
ing alternative sources of power, potable water, medicines and so on (Apampa, 
2008). Corruption to them facilitates their Egalitarian ideals; a way of getting 
some of the stolen wealth redistributed back because of their need to survive. 
Th e well-educated professionals complain of the absence of a level playing fi eld 
in pursuit of their Libertarian ideals. Th ose with the connections or those will-
ing to play the game according to the corrupt order seem to progress; those 
who do the right thing are not adequately rewarded, those who do wrong are 
not eff ectively sanctioned and there is a general blurring of what constitutes 
acceptable standards of behaviour. “If you can’t beat them, join them and if you 
can’t join them, emigrate!” seems to be their mantra. For the entrepreneurs 
and business folk in Nigeria the driving force seems to be access to aff ordable 
fi nance, markets and know-how/technology (Apampa, 2008). Connection to 
public offi  cials or political offi  ce holders is a tried and tested route to aff ord-
able, even if corrupt fi nance and so this group in seeking greater effi  ciencies 
has learnt to leverage alliances towards its Corporatist ideals. 
Against the back drop of class interests in Nigeria and the symbiotic rela-
tionships that exist between business and public offi  ce holders it should not 
come as a surprise that government’s ability or willingness to eff ectively mon-
itor business, sanction deviant behaviour and act as a control is not strong 
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enough and more stringent measures are needed (Aliyu & Elijah, 2008). Th e 
bureaucratic mechanism of control (Ouchi, 1979) is thus weak. In a situation 
where the Director-General of the Securities and Exchange Commission still 
owns an actively trading Stock broking fi rm and is widely believed to have 
been nominated for the post by the Director-General of the Stock Exchange 
and both offi  cers owe their time in offi  ce to the wishes of public offi  ce holders 
emerging from the context described above, it is also not a surprise that there 
is not much of a market for corporate control in Nigeria with neither body 
moving to have the antiquated laws revised that make hostile takeover bids an 
uphill task in Nigeria. Th e alternative would be to seek increased stakeholder 
activism as a control measure: shareholders associations, consumer protection 
groups, labour unions and the media being some of the more obvious groups. 
Researchers who have written about rent-seeking/captured relationships in 
corporate governance in Nigeria lament the extent of the problem between 
some of these groups and business (Apampa, 2008; Okike, 2007; Nmehielle & 
Nwauche, 2004; Yakasai, 2001). Business for its part would like to be left  alone 
to self-regulate. However according to self-regulation theories (reviewed in 
(Jones & Ryan, 1997)) for this to be successful three factors need to be present: 
a standard against which to measure current or future actions, an underlying 
force motivating compliance and fi nally the desire to further some goals and 
avoid others. As has been discussed so far in this paper there is a blurring of 
attitudes to standards as the civic space is neither moral nor immoral to many 
people and so we see a  lot of opportunism and other agency problems, the 
motivations are away from compliance and there are insuffi  cient consequenc-
es from regulatory authorities or stakeholders to make business generally de-
sire to further some goals and avoid others. With mutual capture rife between 
business and government and between business and its stakeholders, borrow-
ing words from Robert Owen5, it is the choices made by society not its laws or 
laws of the markets that determine the social conditions. To deal with corrup-
tion therefore, there is need for a series of choices to be made by business, civil 
society and government in dealing with corruption as a collective.
3. A possible response to context
Th e foregoing arguments notwithstanding Nigerian society is not monolithic 
and three distinct business groups can be identifi ed based on their tolerance 
for corruption (Apampa, 2008): those who have never and will never get in-
volved in corrupt acts and would rather fold up than change this policy (they 
are a minority); those who do not wish to be corrupt and would rather live 
a corruption free existence but cannot see any way they could survive if they 
 5 Robert Owen was  a 19th Century Industrialist.
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were to do so (they are in the majority) and fi nally, those who will be corrupt 
no matter what (they are also a minority). Th e same sort of segmentation can 
be applied to participants in government and civil society. What if all of those 
who would not be instrumental about corruption were to come together to act 
as one? What if they chose to work together to fi nd viable alternatives to cor-
ruption? Will they depart from the old norms if the benefi ts are suffi  ciently 
great (Jensen & Meckling, 1994)? Would they have a good chance to infl uence 
the majority by showing them how they can make integrity pay (Kirkbride and 
Letza, 2008)? Since by the instrumentality of corruption the corrupt order was 
created, by the instrumentality of integrity therefore (once ways and means are 
found) a new custom could be developed. Since society has contributed signifi -
cantly to the manifestation of corrupt behaviour the solution can best be found 
by focusing on the society rather than the individual that exhibits the behav-
iour (Aluko, 2002). A Clan Mechanism of control (Ouchi, 1979) can be built 
by them which utilizes the norm of reciprocity (which assures that should one 
party in a transaction try to cheat another, the cheater, if discovered, will be 
punished by all members of the social system, not only by the victim and his 
or her partners), the legitimization of authority (each participant being mutu-
ally accountable to each other and to the scrutiny and sanctions of the group) 
and fi nally, social agreement on a broad range of values and beliefs. Th is rep-
resents a recreation of conditions inherent in community life and thus holds 
out hope that more interests can be for change if the group also succeeds in 
fi nding viable alternatives to corruption. 
In traditional society of many developing countries a mechanism of control 
is rampant amongst revolving credit schemes called Esusu, Susu, Ajo etc. Apart 
from Chinese society (where it is called Hui) and Japanese society (where it is 
called Tanomoshi) where you fi nd a variation of this concept which depends on 
homogeneity and little or no turnover within its membership (Ouchi, 1979), 
a more robust version tolerant of heterogeneity and high turnover of its mem-
bership is found in Nigeria (Bascom, 1952), throughout West Africa (Little, 
1962), other parts of Africa (Ebaugh & Curry, 2000) and even the Caribbean 
(Maynard, 2004) and many parts of Asia too. Th ese schemes typically pool re-
sources with each member making a contribution and then the entire pot goes 
to one member as a loan which then revolves to other members in turn. It is 
a well-documented fact that compliance with group rules, principles and pro-
cesses in this scheme is remarkably good when compared to compliance at 
the level of formal, private sector fi nancial institutions. How does it work? It 
assumes shared incentives, mutual accountability and peer review within the 
context of a self-governing forum, the norm of reciprocity (which assures that 
should one party in a transaction try to cheat another, the cheater, if discovered, 
will be punished by all members of the social system, not only by the victim 
and his or her partners) is in operation, and a system of shared values and be-
liefs. An amusing aspect of this traditional African institution is that it also has 
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a Western name “Th e Clan Mechanism of Control” (Ouchi, 1979) even though 
there is no popular Western application of the concept. Perhaps the most fa-
mous large-scale application of the concept is in the setting up of Micro-credit 
schemes in Bangladesh through the Grameen Bank by the globally celebrated 
Mohammed Yunus.
One collective action group established on the clan mechanism of control is 
the Business Action Against Corruption (BAAC) in Nigeria. BAAC emphasises 
the importance of good corporate governance practices, and tackling critical 
areas in the business environment and attempts to prevent corruption from 
fl ourishing. Its work examines the entire corporate, regulatory and stakehold-
er framework that ensures eff ective governance including new voluntary and 
mandatory codes and company law, as well as developing joint government-
business strategies in areas such as tax and revenue collection, tenders, permits 
and licenses, the movement of goods and the operations of the courts. Each 
BAAC national programme develops consultative working structures through 
which nationally defi ned strategies can be implemented to improve public ser-
vices, prevailing business trends and standards of leadership behaviour. BAAC 
is also developing continental governance norms and implementation mecha-
nisms and strengthening capacity. BAAC is formed from previously independ-
ent initiatives devised by civil society organizations including businesses and 
NGOs. Demand led, it has political buy-in from governments, which ensures 
supply-side impact and improvement of key governance indicators of capabil-
ity, accountability and responsiveness) (BusinessActionForAfrica.org, 2005). 
As a scheme on its own the BAAC has legitimacy amongst its participants, 
however, if the scheme is to have legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary citizens at 
large then it would need to incorporate certain principles of democratic justice 
as well such as Voice, Power and Respect (O’Toole, 1993). In (Apampa, 2008), 
we learn that (Oyejide & Soyibo, 2001; Yakasai, 2001; Nmehielle & Nwauche, 
2004; Sanda, Mikailu, & Garba, 2005; Central Bank of Nigeria, 2006; Amao 
& Amaeshi, 2007) believe weak voice, power and participation to be respon-
sible for weak control of companies by shareholders’ associations in Nigeria. 
According to the philosopher Mill it is a personal injustice to withhold from 
anyone, unless for the prevention of greater evils, the ordinary privilege of hav-
ing his voice reckoned with in the disposal of aff airs in which he has the same 
interests as other people and so the scheme must incorporate a robust pub-
lic feedback and complaints handling system to ensure the principle of Voice 
(O’Toole, 1993). According to the philosopher Montesquieu true democracy 
exists when the body of the people is possessed of the same supreme power 
or in Aristotlian terms, power must only be exercised for the common good 
(O’Toole, 1993). A mechanism must be worked out which shall give ordinary 
people the power to determine and control how the scheme is run and more 
importantly, in whose interests it is run. Finally Kant tells us that the rulers 
must treat the ruled as ends rather than means (O’Toole, 1993). Th e ruler in 
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a democracy must be equal to the ruled and no better thus accountability of 
the system must refl ect such respect of ordinary citizens or sovereignty dem-
onstrated through self-reporting processes being directed towards them and 
not members only. Let us call such a mechanism Clan Mechanism of Control 
with aspects of democratic justice incorporated in it ‘the Civitas Mechanism 
of Control’ and recognise that it has to balance Libertarian (sought by profes-
sionals), Egalitarian (sought by ordinary citizens) and Corporatist (sought by 
government and entrepreneurs) ends in the one tool. In other words, it must 
eff ectively combine principles of individual liberty, social justice and economic 
effi  ciency in the one social organization (Oladoyin et al., 2005).
Practical lessons that could be taken out of this Civitas Mechanism of Control 
for corporate governance programmes in Africa include: the need for collective 
action as described in this paper; the need to establish the norm of reciprocity, 
recognition of the collective as the legitimate authority (based on principles 
of mutual accountability and peer review) and a system of shared values and 
beliefs underpinning the work in Africa; the need to incorporate voice, power 
and respect systems into a corporate governance system for Africa in order to 
enhance acceptability, applicability, eff ectiveness and sustainability.
4. Approach to corporate governance in Africa
Th is paper began on the note that corporate governance refers to the governance 
arrangements in place to ensure that formal rules, principles and processes are 
complied with which are established to assure that corporate entities meet ac-
ceptable standards of ethical and professional conduct in their activities. What 
then are the arrangements in place in Africa?
First and foremost, each country in Africa has its own Legal and Regulatory 
arrangements for use with a Bureaucratic Mechanism of Control. See (Ouchi, 
1979) for a  complete description of the Market, Bureaucratic and Clan 
Mechanisms of Control. Out of 54 countries in Africa, only 29 have stock ex-
changes and could theoretically deploy a market for corporate control. Th e 
historical context analysis was in favour of a Clan Mechanism of Control in 
Africa rather than the Market or Bureaucracy based schemes favoured by the 
West and for historical/cultural reasons are ineff ective in Africa. How then has 
Africa responded to this need?
Th e response has been to create the African Peer Review Mechanism or 
APRM. Please note that all information provided below on the mechanism 
has been culled from (APRM, 2003). 
Th e African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is a mutually agreed instrument 
voluntarily acceded to by the Member States of the African Union (AU) as an 
African self-monitoring mechanism. Th e APRM is positioned as a key driver of 
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African renaissance and rebirth, and is a centre-piece of the NEPAD process for 
the socio-economic development of Africa. Its mandate is to ensure that the poli-
cies and practices of participating countries conform to the agreed values in the 
following four focus areas: democracy and political governance; economic gov-
ernance; corporate governance; and socio-economic development. 
Th e APR process entails periodic reviews of the policies and practices of partici-
pating countries to ascertain progress being made towards achieving the mutu-
ally agreed goals and compliance in the four thematic areas. National ownership 
and leadership by the participating country are said to be essential factors for the 
eff ectiveness of the APRM. Th e process is designed to be open and participatory. 
According to its own marketing material, the APRM is guided by the principles 
of transparency, accountability, technical competence, credibility and is free from 
manipulation. Th e review process is not meant to exclude or punish countries. 
Th ere is no conditionality attached to the membership.
According to (APRM, 2015), Key Corporate Governance Objectives of the 
APRM are as follows:
i) Provide an enabling environment and eff ective regulatory framework for 
economic activities.
ii) Ensure that corporations act as good corporate citizens with regards to hu-
man rights, social responsibility and environmental sustainability.
iii) Promote the adoption of codes of good business ethics (e.g. Cadbury and 
King Codes) in achieving the objectives of the organization.
iv) Ensure that corporations treat all their stakeholders (shareholders, em-
ployees, communities, suppliers and customers) in a fair and just manner
v) Provide for accountability of corporations and directors.
vi) Standards, indicative Criteria and Examples of Indicators are also provided 
in the same document.
Th e principles of the APRM are seen as a considerable step in the right di-
rection (Ouchi 2009, Apampa, 2008). However, despite the promise and the 
forward trajectory little in the way of impact on corruption has followed over 
the 10 plus years since the APRM was formed. 
Conclusions
From the foregoing the reader should tend towards the conclusion oft en reached 
when reviewing the problems of corporate compliance in Africa, that the setting 
of standards is not usually where the major challenge is as can be confi rmed in 
the case of the APRM. Th e observation is that the African Union are making 
strides and moving in the right direction by using a collective action approach 
involving all the key actors that can bring about change, an approach which is 
very much in keeping with Ubuntu and links with collective action through 
the establishment of a locus of control outside of business, individual govern-
ments or civil society activists.
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Setting clear standards, criteria and indicators and establishing clear rules, 
principles and processes forms the basis of a governance infrastructure and 
one which is based on a system of shared values and beliefs which incorporate 
principles of democratic justice consistent with African traditions.
Th e main challenge facing African countries is their apparent inability to 
operate a norm of reciprocity which (Ouchi, 1979) tells us is indispensable to 
eff ective control mechanisms. Where corruption is pervasive, systemic and 
endemic the ability of the APRM or indeed any scheme based on voluntary 
compliance and dependent on moral persuasion cannot be eff ective. Th e out-
look for business in Africa looks bleak and is likely to remain uncompetitive 
for a considerable time into the future, perhaps indefi nitely, as a result of the 
depth of established corruption.
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